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It barely made the papers. With

media attention focused on the struggle between Congress
and the president to gain the moral high-ground on
spending priorities, reporters hardly noticed that the chief
justice of the United States had been forced to beg for
funds to keep the judicial branch operating. Hat in hand,
the chief told the speaker that the federal government
shutdown had already forced him to draw down cash reserves and operate the federal courts with minimal personnel. Unless judicial branch funding were restored, he
warned, the courts would have little choice but to release
thousands of felony arrestees. Even when budget-cutting
is the order of the day, speedy and public trials cost money. So do prisons. It would not be a pretty sight.
The politicians backed down. There was no question
about it: The voters would blame them. The Republican
Congress passed, and the Democratic president signed, a
separate funding bill for the courts.
Fast forward to 1997. The 105th Congress is Republican, conservative, and ready to flex its budget-cutting
muscles. The president is a two-term Democrat convinced
that he can, once again, wrest the moral high-ground
from his rivals on Capitol Hill. Is this "dja-vfi all over
again" for the chief justice? Hardly. As of Jan. 1, the purse
strings for the judiciary are now firmly in the hands of the
president, not the speaker. If the chief must plead his case
for extra money to operate the judicial branch, he will
have to do so before the chief litigant himself - in the
Oval Office.
The reason for this unseemly state of affairs is 2 U.S.C.
5 691a to 691f, the line item veto. Bequeathed to President Clinton by the 104th Congress as a part of its "Contract with America," it provides in relevant part that when
the president determines that the elimination of "(1) any
dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any
item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit" will "(i) reduce the Federal budget deficit; (ii) not impair any essential [g]overnment functions; and (iii) not
harm the national interest," he may "cancel" it by simply
informing "the Congress of such cancellation by transmitting a special message . . . within five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the enactment of the law providing
the dollar amount ... that was canceled." [2 U.S.C. § 691a
(1996)]
After Jan. 1, "All bills for raising [r]evenue" still "originate in the House of Representatives" and, as before, the
Senate "may propose or concur with amendments as on
other bills." [U.S. Const. Art. I 5 7] In accordance with
long-standing practice designed to keep the president out
of the process by which the judiciary's budget is formulated and approved, the chief executive will still be required
to include the budget requests of the Supreme Court in
his own proposed budget "without revision." 2 The line
item veto is designed to change the dynamic of the postenactment political process set out by Article I, Section 7.
The current understanding is that the president may
veto only an entire enactment, and Congress can override
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that veto by two-thirds vote. Under the line item veto,
"[tihe cancellation of any dollar amount of discretionary
budget authority, item of new direct spending, or limited
tax benefit shall take effect upon receipt in the House of
Representatives and the Senate of the special message notifying the Congress of the cancellation." In order to reinstate the items ("special messages") vetoed, Congress
must enact a disapproval bill that is, itself, subject to veto
pursuant to the presentment clause. [2 U.S.C. 5 691b (a)]
The president has a new weapon, and the question on
the table is whether or not he might be tempted to use it
to put pressure on the judiciary. Answering that question
in the affirmative in testimony before the Senate Government Affairs Committee, Louis Fisher, senior specialist on
separation of powers at the Congressional Research Service, stated:
The [p]resident can use the . . . process in a punitive way against the judiciary. In adversarial confrontations, it does not require an overheated imagination to think of [piresidents presenting ["cancellations"] for the courts in an innocent light (for "savings" and so forth) in an effort to conceal partisan
and political motivations. 3
Whether he will do so remains to be seen, but the
temptations will be substantial. Louis Fisher's testimony
recounts that a January 1938 article in the Washington
Post warned that "that the [flederal government 'is the
chief litigant in the [flederal [c]ourts. It is a party in interest
not only in all the Federal criminal cases but in a large
and growing number of civil actions involving the Government and its citizens."' In the 59 years that have
passed since those words were written, we have witnessed the exponential growth of the modern administrative state, and an equally exponential growth in the types,
complexity, and importance of the issues that it must have
resolved by the federal courts if it is to operate
THE FEDERAL LAWYER 0 27

efficiently 4 . In each of these cases, either the executive
branch, its "independent" appointees, or the president
himself is a real party in interest. 5 When the president
is
6
involved personally, the stakes are even higher.
As might be expected, the line item veto embodied in
2 U.S.C. 5 691 includes provisions designed to limit president's ability to intrude on congressional power to control
spending in politically sensitive areas such as defense and
Social Security. It contains no protections whatever for the
judicial branch. Problems, both real and potential, can
arise should the president attempt to use his newly-acquired "power over the purse strings
of the judiciary to
7
bring a recalcitrant judge into line."
THE ITEM- VETO DEFINED

Four basic veto forms have been identified in American
constitutions: no veto, an all-or-nothing veto, an item
veto, and an item-reduction veto.8 North Carolina is the
only state that does not grant its governor a veto. Six
states and the federal constitution grant the executive an
all-or-nothingveto. 9
The item-veto originated in the Confederacy, and empowers an executive to strike portions of legislation without rejecting the remainder. It is available in one form or
another to 43 state governors. 11 The most limited form is
the reduction-only veto, which allows the executive to alter only appropriations. A revision is valid as long as it
authorizes less spending than the legislature provided,
even if the line is reduced to zero. 12 The "strongest" item
veto is that granted by Article V 5 10 of the Wisconsin
Constitution, which provides that "Appropriation bills may
be approved in whole or in part by the governor, . ..,
and the part objected to shall be returned in the same
manner as provided for other bills." As construed by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, itpermits the governor to veto
phrases, digits, letters, and word fragments; to exercise
partial veto power by striking digits resulting in reduction
of appropriations; and even to change the meaning of legislation by selectively striking phrases and words within a
13
sentence.
Dissenting in
New State Ice Co.
v.Liebmann, Justice
Louis
Brandies observed
that it is "one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose ...
.. try novel social
'
and economic experiments without
Detail: Barbara Hultmann, Justice: A risk to the rest of the
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262, 311 (1932)] As a result, most of what we know about
the item-veto and related devices like "single subject" requirements is based on the experience of the states. 14 At
the federal level, however, innovation and experimentation are not possible, even though the first legislation calling for a presidential item-veto was proposed in 1876, and
more than 150 proposals to grant one have been introduced since that time. The presentment clause, Article I,
57, cl. 2, and the amendment process set out in Article V
are formidable obstacles.
The presentment clause requires that "[e]very Bill
which shall have passed the House of Representatives and
the Senate shall, before it become a Law, be presented to
the [p]resident of the United States" for approval or veto.
No definition of "Bill" is provided, and there is nothing in
the Constitution that requires Congress to present any bill
in a form that includes readily-discernible "lines" that
could be vetoed individually. The desire of successive
presidents to acquire a subject - or rider - item-veto bears
witness to the "liberal" construction given by Congress to
the term "Bill." 15
Exhibit "A" in this regard is the annual appropriations
ritual that marks the beginning of the end of the federal
government's fiscal year. As summer turns into fall, it becomes apparent that there is no way that the House and
Senate will finish work on all the appropriations bills
pending on their respective calendars. Like a train forming
up in the yards, an "Omnibus" appropriations bill begins
to take shape shortly before Oct. 1, the date on which the
new fiscal year begins. With no rhyme or reason other
than the press of time, the "log-rolling" begins. Massive
budgets for diverse agencies and activities are thrown together into a single bill, and riders are attached, decorating it like a Christmas tree with legislation of "special interest" to core constituencies. Larded with substantial
"pork" for the folks back home (and sometimes for the
White House as well), such "bills" slide down the chute
from Capitol Hill and land on the president's desk with a
cover memo that says (implicitly, of course), "Take it, or
leave it." A government shut-down is the alternative. 16
This ritual has become so depressingly familiar in recent years that some writers have asserted that the language, structure, and purpose of the presentment clause
implies the grant of some version of an item-veto, if only
as a device that would enable the executive to maintain
the integrity of the separation of powers implicit in the
grant of a veto power in the first place. 17 Presidents Ford,
Carter, Reagan, and Bush, for example, made extensive
use of signing statements that challenged the constitutionality of specific provisions of the bills they had signed into
law. 18 President Bush openly flirted with asserting an
item veto, but like his predecessors, limited his actions to
signing statements and refusals to enforce.
Most state constitutions seek to prevent log-rolling by
19
requiring legislatures to limit bills to a single subject.
Wisconsin again goes the extra mile, and mandates that
"no private or local bill which may be passed by the legis-

lature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall
be expressed in the title." [Wisconsin Const. Article IV 5
18] The clear purpose of these "single-subject" rules is to
limit legislative discretion:
The item veto represents the coming together of
three widespread state constitutional policies:
the rejection of legislative logrolling; the imposition of fiscal restrictions on the legislature; and
the strengthening of the governor's role in budgetary matters. The item veto may be said to be
at the confluence of the policies underlying the
single-subject rule, the balanced budget requirement, and the executive budget. 20
PRESERVING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

Although the president has an all-or-nothing veto pursuant to the terms of the presentment clause, the chief executive is not powerless to protect the office against legislative attempts to control the considerable discretion Article II vests in the office. 21 The most controversial of the
devices available to the president are overt refusals to enforce, or instructions to subordinates to ignore a specific
part of a bill signed into law. Because the goal is either to
preserve the integrity of the veto power that is granted in
the presentment clause, or to fend off attempts by
Congress to encroach on other express powers of the executive or judicial branches, these devices are sometimes
referred to as "constitutional excision," or "shield," vetoes.
Since they cannot be overridden by legislative action,
however, they are not actually vetoes at all.
Although some have argued that the presentment
clause contains an item-veto in addition to the all-ornothing power it clearly does confer, the president has
never so interpreted it. The debates over the Constitution
shed little light on that specific question, and it need not
concern us here. What those debates do say about the
veto, however, is clearly relevant to this discussion.
There is no doubt that the primary purpose for adopting a veto was to guarantee the separation of powers. 22
In FederalistNo. 73, Hamilton focuses almost entirely on
the dangers of unchecked legislative power. The veto
power is necessary, in Hamilton's view, to accomplish
two distinct goals.
The first is self-preservation. Hamilton wrote that a
"qualified negative" is an essential precondition for an independent executive. Without it, he wrote, the executive
will be "absolutely unable to defend himself against the
depredations of [the legislature]. . . .He might gradually
be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions or
annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the
other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily
come to be blended in the same hands." [id.]
The second reason for including the veto in Article I
clearly anticipates the special interest bills and log-rolling
that combine to comprise today's "Omnibus" spending
bills. A veto, either absolute or qualified, guards "the com-

munity against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of
any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may
happen to influence a majority of that body." [id.]
With Hamilton's concerns in mind, we are now in a
position to look at the line item veto enacted by the 104th
Congress and signed into law by President Clinton. As
passed by Congress, the provision cedes some budgetcutting authority - and the political accountability that accompanies it - to the president. It permits vetoes that do
"not impair any essential [g]overnment functions" and do
"not harm the national interest," [2 U.S.C. 5 691a (A)] but it
does not permit the president to raise or lower "new direct" appropriations. The only option is to cut them from
the legislation entirely. [2 U.S.C. § 691a (2)] It must be exercised within five days from the date Congress passes a
bill [2 U.S.C. 5 691a (B)], and the chief executive may not
cut appropriations that fund existing entitlement programs, such as Social Security and Medicare, but may cut
appropriations for new entitlements or "discretionary budget authority." He may also veto only tax breaks that affect 100 or fewer persons, or 10 or fewer businesses. [2
U.S.C. 55 691a(1), 691e(9)]. "Canceled" items are then subject to the normal legislative process: a majority vote in
both Houses of Congress and presentment to the president for signature or veto. It is only at that point that the
two-thirds override requirement incorporated into the presentment clause is applicable.
To the political branches, the deal is a "win-win"
proposition. Legislators can continue to lard spending bills
with "pork," and blame the president for taking it away.
The president can take credit for eliminating new discretionary spending, entitlements, food stamp program increases, and a limited class of targeted tax breaks, but can
do no real damage to existing programs, except one: the
judicial branch.
THREAT TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

Although the primary topic of FederalistNo. 73 is the
need to protect the executive from the encroachments of
the Congress, Hamilton made it clear that there was a
need to protect the judiciary from the executive as well.
Publiuswas blunt.
It is impossible to keep the judges too distinct
from every other avocation than that of expounding the laws. It is peculiarly dangerous to
place them in a situation to be either corrupted
or influenced by the executive. (emphasis
added)
Is it possible that the president might use this newlyacquired item-veto to manipulate the judiciary's budget,
thus exerting pressure on them? Other than the admonition that a veto should "not impair any essential [g]overnment functions" and should "not harm the national interest," there is nothing in the line item veto that protects the
judiciary. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, chair of the U.S.
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Judicial Conference, has argued that the item veto in its
current form threatens judicial independence. Testifying
on behalf of the executive committee of the judicial conference during joint House-Senate hearings on the subject,
Chief Judge Gilbert Merritt of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in Nashville opposed the item veto on
the same grounds. He gave two reasons:
First and foremost, the Congress, which funds
our budget and closely oversees our spending,
does not litigate cases before us. No conflicts of
interest for judges arises with Congress. The
[p]resident and his Department of Justice litigate
approximately half the cases before us. The Executive Branch is often upset with our rulings.
This puts the courts in a very difficult position.
If the [p]resident cuts our appropriations, we are
basically defenseless. We have no power to
override his veto, and we are prohibited from
engaging in politics. We have none of the power that protects the Congress in this situation.
[p]residents, attorneys [g]eneral and [m]embers
of the Department of Justice have great power.
To permit them to control the [j]udicial budget
would endanger the integrity and fairness of the
[jiudiciary. Litigants against the Department of
Justice would legitimately doubt the capacity of
the courts to dispense even-handed justice. This
may further erode public trust in the courts.
This is our concern.
Second, there is no evidence that the [jiudiciary
is a part of the so-called pork-barrel process.
Our budget is 2 tenths of 1 [percent] of the federal budget. It consists in large measure of
salaries for judges and staff plus rent paid to the
General Services Administration. There is nothing in our budget to build office buildings or
courthouses. Congress appropriates money for
courthouses and GSA builds them. Congress
can eliminate the [j]udiciary from the line-item
veto and the [p]resident will still have the power
23
to veto courthouses.
Judge Merritt is right. For the first time since 1938, the
judiciary's budget is back under the thumb of the president. Is this a good idea, or not? The answer to that question depends upon the answer to a far more fundamental
one: Assuming that we can learn about it, can the chief
executive be held accountable, politically or legally, for
bringing budget pressure to bear on the judicial branch?
The answer lies in the realm of practical politics. For
Congress and the president, the item-veto embodied in 2
U.S.C. 5 691 is a "no lose" proposition. Whatever real
power is transferred to the president is offset by the subject matter limitations Congress has imposed. This compromise seeks, at best, to give the president power to
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eliminate the most egregious forms of log-rolling, special
interest appropriations, and tax breaks by shedding welcome light on the political process by which they are incorporated into "omnibus" spending bills or attached as
riders.
For the judiciary, however, the Line-Item Veto is a
"lose-lose" proposition. Not only does it lose the protection from executive budgeting afforded it by the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921 [42 Stat. 20, § 201(a) (1921)],
the very structure of the item-veto invites a disgruntled
president to classify increases in the judiciary budget designed to offset the burden of an increasing caseload as
"pork-barrel" and thus hide the exercise of raw political
power behind the mantle of the public interest. Louis
Fisher's testimony in opposition to any bill that did not
exempt the Judiciary bears repeating here:
[I]t does not require an overheated imagination
to think of Presidents presenting ["cancellations"]
for the courts in an innocent light (for "savings"
and so forth) in an effort to conceal partisan and
political motivations.
But is it realistic to argue that the line item veto could
affect the balance of power between the executive and judicial branches? Could an executive use the line item veto
to punish, reward, or otherwise influence the judiciary?
Although an implicit guarantee exists in the statutory reference to "essential" government functions in the "national interest," experience at the state level suggests that the
courts will not be immune from executive pressure.
A BRIEF LOOK AT THE STATE EXPERIENCE

Cases involving the use by a governor of the item veto
to cut or eliminate funding for the courts are rare, but
consistently provoke controversy when they do arise.
When Massachusetts legislators projected increased judicial costs and increased the courts' appropriation to
$210.6 million, Gov. William Weld used his item veto to
cut $6.5 million of that sum to reach the $90 million he
needed to cut to bring the entire budget into balance. In
California, Gov. Pete Wilson used his line item veto to cut
25 percent, or $205.7 million, of the state's $806.7 million
budget for the judiciary. He also threatened to veto authorization another $430 million in block grants used by California counties to pay for courts. A crisis was avoided
only after intense lobbying produced an agreement between legislators and the governor.
While financial pressures appear to have been the reason why the governors of Massachusetts and California
used their item vetoes, the New York judiciary may well
have been targeted by Gov. Mario Cuomo for retribution.
After an agreement with the governor's office settled a series of lawsuits by judges against the state for regional pay
disparities, New York became obligated to pay at least
$4.5 million in pay equity awards. The legislature, recognizing the impact that such payments would have on judi-

cial operations, instructed that the pay equity awards
should be paid from accounts generally used for claims
against the state rather than from the judiciary budget.
Gov. Cuomo vetoed that authorization, and effectively
shifted the entire cost from the state operations budget to
the $893 million court system budget.
A more obvious situation arose in Virginia when former Gov. L. Douglas Wilder put intense pressure on Virginia jurists to follow his lead and demonstrate the willingness of all state officials to make sacrifices in tough
budget times. He wrote a letter to Chief Justice Harry L.
Carrico in which he called upon the state's judges to give
up their scheduled pay raises as a means of showing solidarity with the state employees who are not protected by
a constitutional provision prohibiting reductions in salary.
The effect would have been a 2 percent pay cut. In a notso-subtle threat, he indicated that he wasn't so sure the issue could not be taken to court, and hinted that future judicial pay raises might be subject to his veto pen if they
did not cooperate. The state chief justice, acting individually, declined to accept the $2,085 pay increase to which
he was entitled, but pointedly reminded the governor
"that the judiciary, a separate and equal branch of the
government, 'has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the other branches in budget reduction efforts,"
even "at a time of unprecedented growth in case loads
throughout the state ... ,,,24
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Can similar pressures be brought to bear on the federal

courts? Assuming that the item-veto embodied in 2 U.S.C.
55 691a to 691f is constitutional, there is nothing in the
Constitution to prevent it. Article III prevents only
diminution of judicial salaries, not of the operating expenses of the courts themselves or the elimination of proposed pay increases. Like Gov. Wilder, a president under
pressure to cut the budget will need to demonstrate that
proposed cuts are being administered fairly. Whatever the
long-term impact on judicial independence, the short-term
political benefits to be gained from applying a light public
"squeeze" on the judges would be substantial. Pressures
applied for purposes other than "solidarity" might pay political - or personal - dividends as well.
There is an ethical question here, and it is a substantial
one. Canon 2(B) of the American Bar Association's Model
Code of JudicialConduct states that "a judge shall not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment," and forbids political activity, save in very limited circumstances,
for any incumbent judge. [id., Canon 5(D)] Federal bribery
statutes also forbid the giving of gifts, promises, or compensation for services rendered while in service to the
United States. 18 U.S.C. § 203] (See Ethics & Professionalism on page xx of this issue.)
What is the chief justice supposed to say if, during negotiations over the budget for the judicial branch, an incumbent president asks for a "clarification" of a hotly-dis-

puted lower-court ruling over the scope of executive authority or privilege? Must he answer, then recuse from the
inevitable appeal to the Supreme Court?25 One would
hope that the question would never be asked, but it
seems inevitable that some president will do so. Congress
has given the president power to "cancel" any discretionary increases in the judiciary budget, even "necessary"
ones. The office of president is inherently political, and
Hamilton himself wrote in FederalistNo. 73 that "[e]nergy
in the executive is a leading character in the definition of
good government."
Not surprisingly, the antidote for this state of affairs is a
return to the separation of powers embodied in the Constitution. It is far too late to credit feigned professions of
"shock" and "surprise" when the chief executive acts like
a politician. The power of the president exists to be used.
If it should not be used, it should be eliminated.
Congress must take ultimate responsibility too. It is responsible for judicial salary increases, the number of
judgeships, the expansion of the federal court caseload,
and the increasing number of statutes that cede real lawmaking powers to courts and administrative agencies.
Congress should retain full control of the judicial budget, and present it, without riders, to the president for his
approval under the all-or-nothing veto process specified
in the presentment clause. If the president is dissatisfied
with the judiciary's handiwork, let him veto the package
and take full political responsibility.
If Congress is upset with the justices, it can take whatever steps it deems necessary to get its point across. It did
not hesitate to abolish the 1802 term of the Supreme
Court to make a political point, and it could do the same
thing today. But it cannot be held responsible by the voters if it does not do so openly.
Alexander Hamilton made the case for judicial independence as well as it can be made in Federalist78:
[T]he judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it can
never attack with success either of the other two;
and that all possible care is requisite to enable it
to defend itself against their attacks ...
[Tihough individual oppression may now and
then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the
judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the executive.
...[L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear
from its union with either of the other departments; that as all the effects of such a union
must ensue from a dependence of the former on
the latter, notwithstanding a nominal and apparent separation...
Given "the natural feebleness of the judiciary" and its
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"continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate branches," it is time for Congress
to come to the rescue. Our "lives, liberty, and property"
depend, in the first instance, upon the integrity of a judicial process that is already perceived in many quarters to
be highly politicized. 26 It is time to exercise that power.
Exempt the judiciary budget from the line item veto, and
give Mr. Clinton a chance to take a bipartisan stand for judicial integrity. Quibble over the details. Enact reporting
requirements. Make the chief justice appear and defend
every dime of each budget request. But do not force him
to negotiate with the litigator-in-chief. It just doesn't look
good - and it would be unethical.
And thus, it is to Congress that we must turn to call a
halt to this situation before it causes problems. Congress
is the ultimate repository of the power of the purse and of
the power to impeach. As such, it, not the judiciary, is the
guarantor of our freedom. U
The author is a professor of law at Columbus School of
Law at The Catholic University of America in Washington,
D.C. He is a member of the Ohio State BarAssociation and
the State Bar of California (inactive). He specializes in
constitutionallaw, civil rights, and ethics issues.
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